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   This paper analyzes coalitional behavior in principal-multiagent relationships with moral 
hazard, and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side 
contracting. The paper first shows that when agents' efforts are mutually unobservable so 
that their side contracts cannot be contingent on their efforts, the possibility of mutual insur-
ance through monetary side contracts never makes the principal better off. It is then shown 
that when the agents can monitor each other's efforts perfectly, coordination in effort choice 
through side contracts contingent on efforts and outputs enables the principal to reduce the 
cost of implementing iven efforts. This result holds when no production externality exists 
and noise terms are independent, when there is team production and the agents are sufficiently 
homogeneous, orwhen production externalities such as mutual "help" are important and there 
is a pressure toward "egalitarianism."
   KEYWORDS: Principal-multiagent relationships, coalition, side contracts, moral hazard, 
risk sharing, mutual monitoring.
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                                1. INTRODUCTION 
    This paper concerns principal-multiagent relationships. Much of the recent literature in 
this field focuses on the problem associated with the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium (Demski 
and Sappington, 1984; Ma, 1988; Ma, Moore, and Turnbull, 1989; Mookherjee, 1984; Mookher-
jee and Reichelstein, 1990). In her relation with agents, the principal designs a contract for 
each agent so as to elicit desirable efforts as a Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative effort 
choice game played by the agents. The literature points out that in such a situation , given 
contracts offered by the principal, there often exists another Nash equilibrium preferred by all 
the agents to the one the principal wishes to implement. It is thus likely that the agents agree 
to select their preferred equilibrium, and this sort of collusive behavior is costly to the princi-
pal. Some of the authors listed above show that by allowing agents to send auxiliary messages 
about heir private information (state of nature or discretionary action), the problem can be 
resolved costlessly either under adverse selection (Ma, Moore, and Turnbull; Mookherjee and 
Reichelstein) orunder moral hazard (Ma). 
   In this paper, I consider another related problem in a multiagent organization: the pos-
sibility of coalitions through side contracts. One of the recent criticisms on the standard 
principal-multiagent analyses, also relevant to those cited above, is that the relationship is 
characterized by a single grand contract designed by the principal: "All members of the orga-
nization are linked by a grand contract, and their interaction is limited to procedures specified 
by this contract." (Tirole, 1988, p. 461.) In practice, agents are likely to engage in side 
trades (pecuniary or nonpecuniary, implicit or explicit) that are not directly controllable to 
the principal because she cannot observe them. The importance of such coalitional behav-
ior in organizations has been extensively discussed by sociologists for a long time. Related 
remarks are found in the recent reviews of economic theories of organizations by sociologists 
(Baron, 1988, Granovetter, 1985, Perrow, 1986): They criticize economists' overemphasis on 
formal properties of organizations and argue that informal aspects of organizations uch as 
work norms and social relations are no less important. 
   Following Tirole (1986, 1988), I adopt he following full-side-contract ssumption: a group 
s of members can costlessly write any side contract based on information commonly observable 
among them. These side contracts may not be enforceable explicitly when they are contingent 
on private information shared among coalitional members. This full-side-contract assumption 
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thus can be rephrased as follows: it is assumed that a group of members, when forming a 
coalition, abide by their promises built on their common information with probability one. 
This assumption is clearly extreme. However, it also appears an extreme assumption that 
promises that are not self-enforcing are respected with probability zero.' As a first step, this 
paper employs the extreme approach which is the other side of the traditional one.` 
   Side contracts in an organization can be detrimental (the case of collusion) or beneficial 
(the case of cooperation) to the organization as a whole. The case of collusion is analyzed in 
Tirole (1986). He considers a model of the three-tier o ganization with a principal, asupervisor, 
and an agent. After signing a grand contract, he agent observes privately the true value of 
an uncertain productivity parameter, and then selects effort. The supervisor can sometimes 
obtain, without any input, evidence on the true productivity, and report it to the principal. 
Under the full-side-contract ssumption, Tirole shows that although the principal can design 
an initial contract preventing any further side contract (the original contract being coalition-
proof), the possibility of side contracting atthe nexus of information (between supervisor and 
agent) reduces the net payoff to the principal. 
   The main purpose of this paper is to seek for cases in which coalition among agents via 
side contracts leads to cooperation, benefiting the principal. The importance of cooperation 
within organizations is recently discussed in many contexts. For example, the work-team 
concept has recently become popular in the United States. Economists are generally not as 
excited about the idea of teamwork to improve productivity as psychologists, sociologists, or 
practitioners are. The reason is the problem of motivation. Compared with unambiguous 
division of labor and individual-based pay schemes, teamwork, along with group-based pay, 
weakens the connection between pay and the performance of each individual worker, and hence 
is expected to give greater incentives to shirk to workers. Several researchers argue that what 
teamwork and group-based pay do is to modify otherwise inefficient interaction among self-
  ' In fact
, there is experimental evidence that people have "words of honor." See Section 8.   a 
An alternative approach would be to develop a repeated-game model of the agency rela-
tionship to make coalitions elf-enforcing (via reputation). A successful development of such a 
model would answer the question of how the results obtained in this paper under the full-side-
contract assumption would differ in intermediate cases of promises followed with probability 
between zero and one. The costs of that approach are that they tend to become complex and 
messy without adding more implications. As a first step, the easier approach is taken in this 
paper, although the importance of the development of the alternative approach is not meant 
to be underemphasized. 
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interested workers toward a cooperative solution via mutual monitoring and sanctioning, or 
by changing the goals of the workers. (See, for example, Nalbantian (1988) and Levine and 
Tyson (1990).) While this assertion itself must be examined more carefully, it is still not clear, 
even after accepting the argument, whether group behavior of workers is in fact beneficial 
to the employer, in particular, taking into account the emphasis on the detrimental effects 
of coalitional behavior and on "competitive" incentive schemes uch as relative performance 
evaluation and tournaments in the existing literature.3 
    To find some answers to this question, I analyze a Grossman and Hart (1983) type model 
of a principal/two agents relationship. Each agent is risk averse and effort averse, and selects 
unobservable ffort given a contract offered by the principal. In the coalition-free world, 
the principal designs initial contracts contingent on contractible outputs so as to induce the 
agents to select a desirable ffort pair as a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous effort choice 
game. My focus is on "lateral" coalition between the agents playing effort choice games. This 
contrasts with Tirole's model which focuses on "vertical" coalition and.the manipulation of 
information about the agent by the supervisor. 
    The main result of the paper can be most clearly presented in the situation in which neither 
of production externality nor correlation between oise terms exists. It is now well known that 
in such a case the optimal compensation scheme for each agent is individual-based when side 
contracting is infeasible: his pay is independent of the other agent's output (Holmstrom, 1982, 
Mookherjee, 1984). I show that in such a situation, the principal can implement a given effort 
pair with lower costs when the agents can side contract on efforts, choosing a Pareto optimal 
effort pair, than when no side contract occurs. The reason is that the principal can impose 
less risk on the agents without weakening their incentives to select a given effort pair. The 
principal can do so not because the agents can engage in mutual insurance between them 
but because they can monitor each other's effort and hence can coordinate their effort choice. 
In fact, it is shown that when the agents cannot coordinate their effort choice (e.g., because 
efforts are mutually unobservable), and when the role of side contracts i only that of mutual 
insurance between the agents (across publicly observable states), the principal is never better 
 3 In another paper (Itoh
, 1990), I discuss in more detail the recent trend toward cooperation 
in practice, and have applied the results obtained in this paper and other work of mine to 
explain why "cooperation" can be important from incentive viewpoints , in contrast to the 




off when the agents behave as a group. 
   An interesting corollary of the result stated above is that in order to elicit the value of 
cooperation in effort choice, the principal must discard individual-based incentive schemes: 
when no production externality exists, whether the agents behave noncooperatively or co-
operatively does not matter under individual-based schemes. Some forms of interdependent 
schemes, in which an agent is paid more the better the performance of the other agent is, must 
be adopted, despite no information content in an agent's output concerning the other agent's 
effort .4 
   The logic explained above extends to more general cases in which there exist interactions 
between agents in the absence of coalition. I present an analysis of two such cases, the case of 
team production where only the aggregate outputs are publicly observable, and an example 
of production externalities in which each agent can "help" the other agent. It is shown that 
under some conditions, the benefits of side contacts are realized in both cases. The logic is 
exactly the same as in the previous independent case. 
   These contexts analyzed in the paper are clearly in contrast o the multiagent situation 
previously analyzed by many economists, the case in which the principal wants to encourage 
"competition" among agents via relative performance valuation (Baiman and Demski, 1980; 
Green and Stokey, 1983; Holmstrom, 1982; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Mookherjee, 1984; and 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). If production by an agent is independent of the other agent's 
effort, the probability distribution of outputs exhibits the monotone likelihood ratio property 
(Milgrom, 1981), and systematic risk exists o that relative performance evaluation isoptimal, 
then each agent is paid more the lower the output of the other agent is. In particular, if pay in 
the absence of side contracts is determined by rank-order tournaments, improving risk sharing 
generally weakens the agents' incentives to select the efforts the principal wishes to implement. 
Effort coordination is thus detrimental in such a case. 
   There is one important caveat concerning the comparative analysis in this paper. The 
benchmark case of no coalition is the standard second-best solution attained by the optimal 
incentive contract. That is, the possibility that the principal designs more complex revelation 
 4 Laffont (1990) presents a similar esult
, while the logic is quite different. In his model, 
individual-based pay schemes may be avoided by the principal because they may create op-
portunities for a supervisor to "exploit" his agents via a design of games not observable to the 
principal. 
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mechanisms is excluded. When efforts are not mutually observable between agents, this re-
striction is without loss of generality. However, when efforts are mutual observable, if agents 
do not side trade, the principal could attain the first-best outcome by an appropriate direct 
revelation mechanism a la Ma (1988). Thus, some readers may argue that the benchmark in
this case should be the first-best, and hence side contracting by agents contingent on efforts 
would not improve the principal's welfare. 
   Such mechanisms are assumed to be infeasible because they require that the principal 
be able to contract on efforts. The underlying assumption adopted in this paper is that 
contracts can be contingent only on what the relevant parties can observe: The principal 
cannot contract on efforts, even though agents can report them under revelation mechanisms. 
The reason may be costs of communication (she cannot exactly understand what is reported), 
or more importantly, costs of writing contracts (she cannot specify efforts completely in an 
initial contract, as in Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986)). On the other hand, 
when efforts are mutually observable by agents, they can contract on efforts implicitly or 
explicitly in their side contracts. In this sense, this paper is not in a complete contracting 
framework, but in a "semi-complete" contracting framework. And coalition among agents 
may expand the set of feasible contracts when they can contract on their private information 
not observable tothe principal.' 
   Note that such revelation mechanisms would play no role in the world of full side contract-
ing even if explicit contracts on the agents' reports about their efforts were feasible. There, 
once communication channels opened, the agents would collude in communication stages. I
show that there is no coalition-proof revelation mechanism i proving the principal's welfare 
from the case of effort coordination via side contracts without communication with the prin-
cipal. The principal thus would not attempt o centralize the information about the agents' 
efforts.6 
   Recently, the benefits of side contracts have been analyzed independently by several 
economists (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990; Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1990; Ra-
makrishnan and Thakor, 1990; Varian, 1990). They also reach the results imilar to some of 
those found in this paper. I will mention their work later in appropriate places. 
  5 I am grateful to Jean Tirole for suggesting this interpretation
. 
 6 Because of this, I call cooperation in this paper delegated cooperation i Itoh (1990). 
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   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the possibility of side con-
tracting contingent on outputs only. Section 3 examines the effect of side contracts contingent 
on effort choice when production is individualistic and the optimal coalition-free contract is 
individual-based. Sections 4 and 5 are extensions to cases of team production and production 
externalities, respectively. Comparison with relative performance evaluation is discussed in 
Section 6. Section 7 shows that revelation mechanisms do not improve the principal's welfare. 
Section 8 is concluding remarks.
             2. MUTUAL RISK SHARING THROUGH SIDE CONTRACTING 
    This section presents a general model of the principal-multiagent relationship with the 
possibility of side contracting among agents contingent o ly on publicly observable m asures. 
Throughout the section, it is assumed that each agent cannot bserve the effort chosen by the 
other agents. They hence cannot enforce Pareto optimal effort choice through side trades. The 
role of side contracts is then that of mutual risk sharing among a ents. Inthis section I show 
that the possibility of mutual insurance alone never benefits the principal. To this end, all 
possible side contracts among the agents are incorporated intothe original contract designed 
by the principal such that any further contracting is prevented. The principal can design such 
a coalition-proof c ntract without any loss. While side transfers never occur when the original 
contract is formulated in such a way, there being the possibility of side contracting reduces 
the principal's net payoff. 
    There are one principal and two agents, indexed byn = 1, 2. Agent nselects effort e,,, from 
a compact set of feasible efforts, which we assume is asubset ofa finite dimensional Euclidean 
space. Output xn of agent n depends onthe effort pair (ei, e2) selected bytwo agents and a 
noise term through a production fu ction. There are In, possible output levels xi < ... < x' 
for agent n. Each i C SZ,z = { 1, ... , In } is called an outcome of agent . Let P2j (ei, e2) be the 
joint probability of output pair (xi , x~) induced by the production functions when the effort 
pair (ei, e2) is chosen. It is assumed that there isno moving support: Pi3 (ci , e2) is strictly 
positive for each (el, e2) and (i, j). 
   The preference of each agent is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion. Agent n has an additively separable utility function V., (w) - G,,,(en) where w is remu-
neration from the principal. Vn is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, strictly 
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increasing, and strictly concave: agents are assumed to be risk averse. G,,,(e7z) represents a 
disutility of effort e,,. Each agent is assumed to be effort averse: Gn is strictly increasing in
each component ofe,,,. The expected utility of agent n is denoted by Um. 
    The principal behaves as a Stackelberg leader to select a compensation scheme for each 
agent: She has the ability to commit herself to the scheme. Efforts are assumed to be un-
observable to the principal while the outcome (or equivalently, the output) of each agent 
is publicly observable and contractible. Compensation schemes are hence contingent only 
on outcomes (i, j) E fZ1 X Q2. Let wn = (w ,) be a payment scheme for agent n, where 
w is the payment to agent n when output pair (xi, x?) is realized. The principal is as-
sumed to be risk neutral. Let Bi .j be the benefit of the principal from the output pair 
(xZ,x~) and B(e1,e2) _ Ei Ej Pij(e1,e2)Bi.7 be the expected benefit. Bid is assumed to 
be strictly increasing in i and j. The objective of the principal is to maximize the net 
profit, which is given by the expected benefit minus the expected payments to the agents 
B(ei, e2) - Ei Ej Pij (e1,e2)(w ,',' + w23').
The coalition-free solution 
   As a benchmark, I first define the principal's problem when side contracting is infeasible . 
Following Grossman and Hart (1983), I decompose the principal's problem into two parts. In 
the first part, the principal fixes an effort pair (e1, e2) and finds the compensation schemes 
which implement it with least costs. This problem is called the implementation problem for that 
effort pair. The solution to this problem defines the minimum expected cost of implementing 
(e1, e2), denoted by C(e1, e2). Once the implementation problem is solved for each effort pair, 
in the second part, the principal chooses the effort pair which maximizes her expected net 
profit B(e1i e2) - C(e1, e2). It is sufficient o examine the implementation problem for most 
of the results in this paper. Throughout the paper
, I only consider the implementation of the 
efforts which are not least costly, that is, G,z(e,,) > mine G7z(e) for each n. 
   To define the implementation problem for (e1,e2) formally, let v = V,,(w~ 
3-), and 0" be 
the inverse function of V,. I sometimes call 0 a compensation scheme for agent n
, instead of 
w'. Then the implementation problem in the absence ofcoalition, called (CF) which represents 
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"coalition free
," is defined as follows: 
            min Pij(el,e2)(01(vij) +02(V2                        )) 
                     i j
             subject to 
                   elc argmax~ Pij(e,e2)v ilj - G1(e) 
(CF) e a j          (IC) 
                    e2 E argmax Pij(el, e)v - G2 (e) 
                                                                         13 
e                                  i j 
            (PC) EPij(el,e2)v j - G,,(e,,) > Un for n = 1,2. 
                        i j
The objective function in (CF) is the principal's expected payments othe agents. Constraints 
(IC), incentive compatibility constraints, imply that the agents elect aNash equilibrium effort 
pair of the simultaneous-move game of effort choice following the specification f compensation 
schemes by the principal. Constraints (PC) are the participation constraints: the expected 
utility of agent n must be at least as large as his reservation utility level Un. The solution to 
this problem is called the optimal coalition-free schemes. 
The coalition-proof solution 
   I now introduce the possibility of coalition between two agents into the model. After 
accepting the contracts offered by the principal, but before outcomes are realized, the agents 
engage in side contracting contingent on publicly observable outcomes/outputs only. A side 
contract specifies monetary transfers t = (ti j) where ti j is the transfer from agent 1 to agent 
2 when outcomes (i, j) realize. 
   Suppose that a side contract is signed after the agents elect heir efforts independently. 
Whether acontract is signed before or after efforts are chosen does not actually matter. Given 
the effort pair (el, e2 ),they select a Pareto optimal side contract. That is, t solves 
             max Pij(el,e2)Vl(w - tij) - G1(el) 
                    i j 
           subject to E 1: Pij(el,e2)V2(w j +tij) - G2(e2) > U2 
where U2 is the utility level guaranteed to agent 2 in the agreement between the agents. U2 
could depend on (el, e2, w1, w2) as well as the technologies and the preferences of the agents. 
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I only assume that U2 > U2: otherwise, agent 2 would not agree to form a coalition with 
agent 1. The first-order condition yields the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto 
optimal transfers a  follows: there xists A such that for each (i, j), 
                    V11(w! -tij)=AV2(w? - +tij) (2.1) 
where A is positive and possibly depends on (e1, e2, w1, w2) and all the parameters of the 
model, as U2 does. 
    Note that ransfers from agent 1to agent 2do not directly affect the principal's payments 
to them. The only effect of side transfers comes from the fact hat they alter the effort choice 
game played by the agents: the agents will select the efforts based on their final incomes 
after side transfers ather than their compensation designed by the principal. How does the 
possibility ofsuch a side contract between agents change the principal's welfare? 
   As Tirole (1986) pointed out in his model of principal/supervisor/agent r lationships, 
the principal in our model can, without any loss, design the initial contract so as to prevent 
any further side contracting between agents. This is called the equivalent principle by Tirole: 
without loss of generality, the principal can limit herself to contracts which do not induce the 
agents to form a coalition, once the new constraint that the initial contract must attain the 
optimal mutual risk sharing between the agents is introduced . I call such contracts coalition-
proof. By (2.1), coalition-proof compensation schemes (v1, v2) have to satisfy the following 
coalition incentive compatibility constraints (CIC 1): 
(CIC1 1    ) ~i (vi 1) _ 2 (v? ) for each (i, j) .                                  ~l' i j 
The principal's (implementation) problem for (ei,e2), called (CP), is then defined as follow:' 
                                  " ~ E
m 
                vn ~Pij(e1, e2)(01(v ~) + 02(v ~)) 
(CP) i 
                 subject o (IC), (PC), and (CIC 1). 
The solution to this problem is called the optimal coalition-proof schemes. Note that since 
 7 In problem (CP)
, it is implicitly assumed that positive A is chosen by the agents and 
the principal knows that value. The results shown below would not change even when the 
principal herself could select A. 
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efforts are mutually unobservable, each agent selects his effort independently despite the op-
portunity of side contracting. The following result is now immediate.8 
THEOREM 1. When only outputs are mutually observable to the agents, the possibility of 
monetary side contracting between them contingent on their outputs never makes the principal 
better off. 
   The severity of constraints (CIC 1) can be illustrated most clearly in the case where the 
optimal coalition-free compensation scheme for an agent is independent of the other agent's 
output. Such a scheme iscalled an individual-based cheme. It is immediate to conclude that 
individual-based schemes cannot satisfy (CIC 1) unless either e1 or e2 is the least costly effort 
(which case is excluded by assumption). To see this, suppose that there is no production 
externality and that the noise terms are stochastically independent. It is well known in the 
literature of relative performance valuation (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Mookherjee, 1984) that 
in such a case the optimal coalition-free contract is individual-based. If e1 is not the least 
costly effort, the optimal individual-based scheme for agent 1 is not flat. Then (CIC 1) imply 
that any coalition-proof compensation for agent 2 must depend on the output of agent 1, so 
that it cannot be an individual-based scheme. 
COROLLARY 1. Individual-based incentive schemes are not coalition-proof. 
   Theorem 1 implies that when agents' efforts are unobservable to each other, their coalition 
through monetary side contracting is never beneficial to the principal. Another way of stating 
this result, as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Varian (1989) emphasize, is that in order 
for coalition among agents to be of value to the principal, it is necessary that the agents share 
some information unobservable to her. In the subsequent sections, I assume that the agents 
can monitor each other's effort, so that the efforts are contractible between the agents.
I
       3. MUTUAL MONITORING IN EFFORT CHOICE: CASE OF INDEPENDENCE 
   I hereafter assume that each agent can observe the other agent's choice of effort. This 
implies that the agents can write a (enforceable) side contract contingent on their effort choice 
 8 The same result is independently presented in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Ramakr-
ishnan and Thakor (1990), and Varian (1989). 
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as well as their outputs. As a result of such side contracting, they can enforce a Pareto optimal 
effort pair.9 The question is whether such a coalition improves the principal's welfare. 
   Contrary to the case of side contracting without mutual monitoring, it may not be in the 
principal's interest to prevent further side contracting when mutual monitoring is possible. The 
reason is that she may prefer the agents to coordinate their effort choice via side contracts. The 
following approach isthus taken. I first formulate he principal's (implementation) problem for 
a given effort pair (e1, e2) under the assumption that the agents side contract on their efforts as 
well. She designs the initial contract so as to implement (el, e2) as a Pareto optimal effort pair 
agreed upon by the agents in their coordination process. However, she prevents any other side 
transfer contingent on outputs. Side transfers hence do not occur as long as the agents elect 
the effort pair they agreed on. This problem is called (EC), representing "effort coordination." 
I then compare this problem with the principal's problem (CF) for coalition-free contracts. 
If there exist feasible compensation schemes for problem (EC) which can implement (el, e2) 
with lower costs than the solution to (CF), then I can conclude that the principal is better off 
under side contracting between the agents than under no side contracting. 
   In problem (EC), the incentive compatibility constraints (IC) are replaced by the following 
two coalitional incentive compatibility constraints (CIC 2) and (CIC 3): 
           (elie2) C argmax~ Pij(ei~e2)v ~ - G1(e1) 
(CIC2) el'e2 Z 
                  subject to Pij(e1,e2)v2j - G2(e2) > U2;
(CIC3) P2j(el' e2 )v - G7 (en) 1'ij(eN(v))v13 - Gn(en (v)) for n = 1, 2 
          i j i j 
where N(v) (e1 (v), e2 (v)) is a Nash equilibrium effort pair under the schedule v = (v1, v2 ). 
Constraint (CIC 2) implies that he agents enforce ( 1, e2) specified bythe principal s a Pareto 
optimal effort pair through side contracting. Constraints (CIC 3) imply that each agent is in 
fact better off by coordinating their effort choice than by selecting the efforts independently. 
If (CIC 3) did not hold, they would not be able to reach agreement on the effort choice in 
their coordination process. 
  9 As I discussed in Introduction
, the enforcement problem is assumed away. However, see 
Section 8 for an informal discussion concerning enforcement mechanisms. 
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   The principal's problem (EC) for a given effort pair (e1, e2) is then defined as follows: 
             ,z12 ~~Pij(e1,e2)(O1(v~)+02(v~)) 
(EC) Z i 
              subject o (PC), (CIC 1), (CIC 2), and (CIC 3). 
Under any compensation schemes satisfying all the constraints in problem (EC), the agents 
have no incentive to exercise the side contract as long as they have selected the Pareto optimal 
effort pair. They engage in side contracting only to enforce their coordinated effort choice. 
And they in fact prefer to do so because of (CIC 3). 
   There are several.remarks on problem (EC). First, note that in the general framework 
presented here I do not assume the existence of transferable utility.10 If utility is transferable, 
(PC) and (CIC 2) are simplified as follows: 
(TPC) Pij(e1,e2)(V"                           3+v2j)- G1(e1) - G(e2) >_ U1 + U2;
(TCIC2) (e1, e2) E arg max ~ ~ P2j(ei, 2)(vij + v2j) - G1(ei) - G2 (e? );
                                        el'e2 i j 
Similarly, constraint (CIC 3) will be replaced by the weaker constraint hat the sum of the 
agents' expected utilities is as high as the sum of the expected utilities under their noncoop-
erative ffort choice. However, (CIC 3), when modified in such a way, is then always atisfied 
by definition. The existence oftransferable utility is beneficial to the principal, particularly 
when the agents are not homogeneous, because then she will not need to worry about payoff 
allocation between the agents, as we will see later in this section. 
   Second, I have not substituted first-order conditions for (CIC 2) as we did for (CIC 1). 
Additional conditions are required to ensure that the first-order conditions are necessary and 
sufficient. In fact, the main result in this section presented below does not rely on the "first-
order approach." 
   Third, in problem (EC), it is implicitly assumed that U2 and A are determined by the 
agents and the principal knows those values. 'Below, I show that somehow surprisingly, whether 
 10 Utility is transferable if there xists a good such that the utility of agent n who possesses 
z,z amounts of the good is given by V12(w) - G,,,(e,z) + zn. 
                             12
or not the principal knows how the agents reach an agreement, she can direct hem to particular 
U2 and A and enforce those values on the agents who accept he initial contracts: the agents, 
once they accept he contracts offered by the principal, can in no way agree on a bargaining 
solution different from what has been specified by the principal in the initial contracts. 
   In this section, I analyze the case where the optimal contracts consist of individual-based 
schemes in the absence of coalition. Sufficient conditions for this to be true is that there is 
no production externality (production functions are separable in effort) and the noise terms 
are stochastically independent . Although the independence of noise terms is not necessary 
for independent schemes to be optimal (Mookherjee, 1984), both conditions are assumed 
throughout this section for simplicity. Thus, Pig (e1, e2) = P1(e1)P~ (e2) for each (i, j ), given 
(e1, e2). All the results presented in this section hold when the noise terms are correlated, so 
long as the optimal coalition-free schemes are individual-based .
Case of homogeneous agents 
    I first consider the case where the agents are symmetric in preferences and production 
functions. More precisely, I assume: (a-i) two agents have the same utility-on-income function 
V; (a-ii) they have the same disutility function G and the same reservation utility level U; 
(a-iii) they have identical production technology so as to have the same probability Pi(e) of 
output xi for each outcome i E St = { 1, ... , I} and each effort e; and (a-iv) their outputs are 
equally valued so that Bi.1 = Bji for each i,j E ft Under assumptions (a-i)-(a-iv), there is a 
symmetric effort pair (e, e) which isthe second-best (in the absence of coalition). 
    Let v' _ (vi) be the optimal coalition-free compensation scheme foragent . By symme-
try, vZ = v3 ~if i = j. Before presenting thegeneral result, consider anexample of two possible 
outcomes SZ = { L, H } with XL < XH. Let p(e) = PH(e) be increasing  each component of e. 
The optimal coalition-free scheme implementing effort efor each agent (which I have assumed 
is not least costly) satisfies vL< vH. Define the new interdependent schedule (v1, 0) by 
                     vj = vj = 2vi + 2v; (3.1) 
for each i, j = L, H. Under the original individual-based contract, agent n faces the following 
lottery; the higher wage vH with probability p(e) and the lower wage vL with probability 
1 - p(e). Under the new interdependent scheme, the lottery changes to; vH with probability 
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i
(p(e))2, vL with probability (1- p(e) 2, and 1(vH + vL) with probability 2p(e) (1- p(e)). Note 
that each agent is paid higher compensation as the outcome of the other agent is better. 
   The new schemes satisfy constraints (CIC 1) when A = 1 since the agents are paid an equal 
amount of compensation in each outcome pair (i, j). And if the agents forming acoalition agree 
to select he given effort pair (e, e) under the new schemes as well, the principal's expected 
payments o the agents will be reduced by adopting (0,0) because l ss risk is imposed on 
them. 
   In the absence of the coordination i effort choice by the agents, the new interdependent 
schemes weaken each agent's effort incentives since the marginal utility on income with respect 
to his effort is now half of that under the original independent scheme. However, when the 
agents can monitor each other's efforts and contract on them, this loss in incentives can be 
avoided: I show in the next theorem that the interdependent schemes constructed above induce 
the agents to select he same ffort e when they side contract. The theorem consists of two 
parts. First, I prove this result supposing that the principal can select U2 and A and the agents 
follow her direction. Then, it is shown that the agents, once they accept he initial contracts, 
cannot agree on (U2, A) other than those in the initial contracts, because one of the agents 
must suffer from the expected utility lower than his reservation level in other solutions.11 
THEOREM 2. The following hold under the assumptions given above: (a) If the principal can 
choose (U2, A), she can implement any given symmetric effort pair (e, e) with less costs under 
side contracting on efforts than under no side contracting; (b) The agents, once they accept 
the initial contracts, cannot agree to attain a Pareto optimal utility pair different from what 
the principal specified in the initial contracts. 
PROOF: Suppose that (vz) and (v~) are the optimal coalition-free schemes fora given effort 
                                                ,v ~)by e, which are symmetricinthe s nse of vZ=v~if i = j.Define the newschemes (v13 
(3.1) for each i and j. Part (a): Simple calculation shows that (v1, v2) satisfies (PC) and (CIC 
3) for each agent, because of symmetry. Concerning (CIC 2), by definition, v2~ + 0 = vi + v~ 
for each (i, j ). Thus, (e, e) maximizes the sum of the agents' expected utilities under the 
 11 A special, version ofthe theorem was first proved inItoh (1988). Recently Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1990) prove asimilar result in the linear model developed by Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987). Related results are found in Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1990) and 
Ramakrishnan andThakor (1990) in which a specific orm of production externality is assumed, 
as is mentioned in Section 6. 
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new schemes, which isequal to (>iPi(e1)vi - G(el)) + (> Pj(e2)v~ - G(ee)), because 
e maximizes each agent's expected utility under the original scheme. Let U2 be defined by 
U2 = >i >2 j Pig (e, e)v - G(e). Then (e, e) satisfies (CIC 2), and the expected utility of agent 
1 is also equal to U2 by symmetry. Then (v1, v2) satisfies (CIC 1) for each (i, j) with A = 1 
because the agents are paid equally in each pair of outcome. As the last step, one can easily 
show that by Jensen's inequality, the expected wage payments of the principal are strictly 
smaller under the new schemes than under the original individual-based schemes. 
   To show Part (b), note that the optimal coalition-free scheme gives each agent exactly his 
reservation utility level. Thus, U2 defined above is equal to U and hence ach agent attains 
exactly U under the new schemes. Thus, after accepting the initial contracts, if the agents 
attempt o choose adifferent point on the Pareto frontier, one of them must suffer from the 
expected utility lower than the reservation level, and hence cannot agree on such a point. 
Therefore, they must follow the direction specified by the principal. Q.E.D.
   The intuition of the result goes as follows. Effort coordination enables the principal 
to improve risk sharing between her and each of the homogeneous agents by designing an 
interdependent schedule for them, without weakening their incentives to select a given effort 
pair. Side contracting with mutual monitoring is thus beneficial to the principal. Note that 
the principal is better off under coalition not because the agents can share risk between them, 
but because they can monitor each other's effort and coordinate their choice of efforts. We 
have already seen that mutual risk sharing only never makes the principal better off. It is also 
easy to observe that Theorem 2 holds without the possibility of mutual insurance. Suppose 
that monetary side transfers are impossible (e.g., because they are conspicuous) o that mutual 
risk sharing is unavailable between the agents, while they can coordinate their efforts through 
some nonpecuniary transfers like the norm of reciprocity. Such a modification does not change 
the conclusion of Theorem 2 at all."
Case of asymmetry: example of constant absolute risk aversion 
    I next assume that agent n has the utility function with constant absolute risk aversion 
rn: Vn(w) _ - exp(-rnw) for w > 0. With this specification, constraints (CIC 1) can be 
 12 On the other hand, Varian (1989) suggests that the principal possibly realizes the benefits 
from mutual insurance between agents if their private information is exogenous information 
(about he state of nature), instead of endogenous information (about discretionary actions). 
(These terms are by de Groote (1988).) 
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Irewritten as follows: 
1 
                     v2 = are for each (i, j). (3.2)                                      v23 . r1 
   If utility is transferable, it is easily shown that the result presented above is extended to 
this asymmetric case. Because of the existence oftransferable utility, (PC) and (CIC 2) are 
simplified as (TPC) and (TCIC 2). Note, however, that the existence oftransferable utility 
does not change their incentives for mutual insurance via monetary side transfers. I define 
(v1, v2 ), satisfying (3.2) with A = 1, as follows: for each (i, j ), 
                                   r2 
v21 + v72                                v2~                                 r (3.3) 
                                       r1 1 2                              v = r v2 + v3
where (v1, v2) is the optimal contracts implementing a given effort pair (e1, e2) in the absence 
                            ij 13 + v =vi + v~ . Thus, the agents select (el ie2) under of coalition. Then for ach (i,j), v
the new schemes, and hence (TCIC 2) is satisfied. Similarly, the sum of the agents' expected 
utilities i equal to U1 + U2. Finally, straightforward c lculation shows that the principal's 
expected payments are smaller under the new schedule than under the original schedule. 
   When utility is not ransferable, th  xtension of the result to the asymmetric case ismore 
complicated b cause the principal must care about payoff allocation between the agents. For 
simplicity, suppose that (CIC 2) can be replaced by the first-order condition with the same 
A as in (CIC 1). The principal can still elicit a given effort pair from the effort-coordinating 
agents with less costs and give them exactly their reservation utility levels. She can do so by 
giving more bargaining power to agent 2 (A > 1) when he is less risk averse, has better outside 
options, or incurs higher disutility of work than agent 1. However, then agent 1 might find it 
in his interest not to cooperate with agent 2 but to behave independently because the effort 
choice of agent 2 tends to be less sensitive to whether agent 1 plays the coordinated effort or 
behaves independently. Therefore, the principal might have to give agent 1 an expected utility 
level higher than his reservation level. Because we have seen in Theorem 2that this does not 
happen for homogeneous agents,13 the result in the symmetric case will still hold as long as 
the extent of asymmetry is sufficiently small. 
 13 Note that Theorem 2does not assume the existence oftransferable utility. 
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Effort coordination is of no value under individual-based schemes 
   One important implication from the analysis in this section is that individual-based in-
centive schemes cannot be optimal when the agents coordinate their effort choice, even if 
they do not share risk between them. Although I do not solve problem (EC) for the optimal 
schedule, it is clear that under individual-based schemes, the expected utility of each agent is 
independent of the effort of the other agent, and hence the agents' effort choice is not affected 
by whether they coordinate fforts or not. Thus, side contracting on efforts has no value under 
individual-based incentive schemes. Some forms of interdependent schemes, under which an 
agent's compensation is contingent on the performance ofthe other agent as well, are necessary 
for effort coordination. to be of value to the principal. 
COROLLARY 2. When no production externality exists, effort coordination by agents is of no 
value to the principal under individual-based incentive schemes.
         4. MUTUAL MONITORING IN EFFORT CHOICE: TEAM PRODUCTION 
   In this section and the following two sections, I extend the analysis in the preceding section 
to cases in which each agent's welfare is interdependent on the other agent's effort under the 
optimal coalition-free schemes. Such a case applies (i) when there is team production so 
that the output of each individual agent is unobservable; (ii) when there exist production 
externalities, such as "help," and hence the optimal coalition-free contract pays an agent 
higher emuneration the better the performance of the other agent is; (iii) when no production 
externality exists, yet there xist systematic risks so that noise terms are (positively) correlated 
and relative performance evaluation is optimal. This section deals with the case of team 
production. Then in the next section, I consider a model of effort allocation among tasks as 
an example of production externalities. I show that the conclusion i the previous section (the 
benefits of effort coalition) can still hold in cases (i) and (ii) under some strong conditions. 
Important distinction of these two cases from case (iii) is then discussed in Section 6. 
   Let me modify the model introduced in Section 2such that the principal cannot observe 
the output of each agent separately but aggregate output is contractible. Suppose that there 
are I possible total output levels x1 < < xI and let 9 = { 1, ... , I} be the set of outcomes. 
Total output is determined by efforts exerted by two agents and a noise term. Let Pi (e1, e2) 




be the probability of x = xi when (e1, e2) is chosen by the agents. The benefit from output 
xi is written as Bi, which is strictly increasing in i, and the expected benefit of the principal 
is now defined by B(e1, e2) _ Ei Pi(el, e2 )Bi. Other definitions are accordingly modified as 
well. 
    To simplify the exposition, hereafter in this section, I assume that the effort variable is 
one-dimensional, and moreover, I = 2 and c = {L, H}. The results presented in this section 
continue to hold for the more general case of I > 2. 
    I first consider the case in which the "first-order approach" is valid. Let p(e1, e2) be 
the probability that output is xH, and suppose that p(.) is twice continuously differentiable 
and strictly increasing in e,,, for n = 1, 2. This second assumption implies that p(.) satisfies 
strict monotone likelihood ratio property (strict MLRP). Also suppose that Gn(.) is twice 
continuously differentiable and strictly convex. Then if p(.) also satisfies convexity of the 
distribution function condition (CDFC), that is, p(.) is concave in en for each n, then the 
first-order approach is valid: the incentive compatibility constraints (IC) in the absence of 
coalition can be replaced by the first-order conditions, and the optimal coalition-free incentive 
schemes (v1, v2) are monotone increasing (vH > v ,). See Rogerson (1985) for the proof. 
    The next theorem is a counterpart ofTheorem 2in this team context. Although I am 
simplifying the statement, the theorem consists of the same two parts as those in Theorem 2. 
In the theorem, the homogeneity of the agents is defined by (a) i) and (a-ii) in the previous 
section, and instead of (a-iii), by the following assumption: the agents have an identical 
production technology so that for each i, Pi is exchangeable, that is, Pi (e1i e2) = Pi (e2 ,e1). 
The proof is in Appendix. 
THEOREM 3. Under the assumptions given above, if p(.) is convex in (el, e2) and the agents 
are homogeneous, theprincipal can implement any symmetric effort pair with less costs under 
side contracting on efforts than under no side contracting. 
    Because of symmetry, the optimal coalition-free compensation schedule for a symmetric 
effort pair (e, e) pays each agent an equal compensation vi in -each outcome i. Then in the 
proof, a new scheme is defined by vi = 1 -vi + 2 (U + G(e)). The new scheme reduces the 
variation of compensation (i utility units) to half of that under the original scheme so as to 
satisfy the other constraints. This reduction of risk does not alter the agents' incentive to 
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select a given effort pair when they side contract on efforts. And the principal's payments are 
lower because of the improvement i  risk sharing. 
   The role of the conditions in the theorem is to ensure that (e, e) satisfies (CIC 2). The 
effort pair (e, e) is a Nash equilibrium under (vi) so that it is a person-by-person optimal 
effort pair for problem (CIC 2). However, this does not generally imply that (e, e) is the 
overall optimal effort pair. The conditions given above, the convexity of p(.) which is stronger 
than CDFC, is sufficient for the person-by-person optimum to be globally optimal, as Marschak 
and Radner (1972) and Radner (1962) showed.` 
   Another sufficient condition, though obvious, isthat (e, e) is the unique Nash equilibrium 
under the optimal coalition-free schemes. Unfortunately, this is not usually the case. As 
Demski and Sappington (1984) and Mookherjee (1984) showed, there often exists another 
equilibrium preferred by all the agents to the one the principal wishes to implement. And we 
do not know sufficient conditions for the uniqueness. 
    If there exist multiple quilibria under the optimal coalition-free contracts, the benchmark 
problem (CF) of implementing a given effort pair must be examined ` more carefully. This 
multiple quilibrium problem does not cause any trouble in the absence ofcoalition, if, for 
example, the effort pair the principal wants to implement is he one most preferred by all the 
agents among equilibrium efforts. However, the following example shows that the existence of 
multiple quilibria could issipate he benefits ofeffort coalition even in such a case. 
Example. Suppose that each agent has finite feasible effort levels e1 < • • • < e'. The prob-
ability that H realizes i assumed todepend only on the minimum ofagent 1's effort and 
agent 2's (i.e., the efforts are perfect omplements). Let pk be the probability ofH when the 
minimum ofe1 and e2 is ek, with p1 < • • • < pl`c. The disutility of effort ek is denoted by 
gk = G(ek) which is increasing in k. Let f k = (gk - gk-1)/(pk - pk-1) for k > 2. Assume 
that there xist "decreasing returns to effort," that is, 
                                    f2<...< fK. (*) 
   Fix k > 1 and consider the implementation problem ofthe symmetric effort pair (ek, ek). 
(The second-best ffort pair is clearly symmetric in this example.) When coalition is infeasible, 
the optimal coalition-free schemes (vi, vH) satisfy 
                             vH-vL = fk. (**) 
 14 The validity of the first -order approach is also a part of the sufficient conditions in their 
results as the person-by-person optimal actions are assumed to satisfy first-order conditions. 
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iIt is easy to see this because each agent has no incentive to increase his effort unilaterally, and 
by (*), the incentive compatibility constraints are binding only for the constraint that each 
agent does not deviate to the next lower effort ek-1. Then it can be easily shown that under 
W , vs), (e1, e1), ... , (ek, ek) are all Nash equilibria. However, since ach agent's expected 
utility under (ek, ek) (which the principal wishes to implement) is at least as high as his 
expected utility under any other equilibrium, the existence of multiple equilibria does not 
cause a serious problem in implementing (ek, ek). 
    Next, consider the case of effort coordination. Can the principal find a new schedule 
(IL, ik) which implements (ek, ek) with less risk imposed on the agents (vkj - vjk, < f k)? 
The answer is no, since if risk is reduced from f k, then the agents strictly prefer choosing 
(ek-1, ek-1) to (ek, ek). Thus, in this example, ffort coordination does not yield any extra 
benefit to the principal. 
    In the example, the assumption of strong complementarity between the efforts makes 
the reduction of risk under effort coordination infeasible. The next theorem shows that if 
such a complementarity does not exist, then a given symmetric effort pair , when it is the 
most preferred equilibrium for both agents under the optimal coalition-free contracts , can be 
implemented with less costs under coalition with mutual monitoring of efforts than under no 
coalition. In the theorem, a Nash equilibrium (e1, e2) is called dominant if there exists no 
other equilibrium that at least one agent strictly prefers to (e1, e2). Note that this condition 
is stronger than undominated Nash equilibrium. Two conditions coincide if there only exist 
symmetric equilibria. 
THEOREM 4. Assume that the agents are homogeneous, and for en > e;Z, n = 1, 2, 
                  p(e1, e2) - p(e1, e2) > p(e1, e2) - p(ei, e2). (4.1) 
Then if (e, e) is a dominant Nash equilibrium under the optimal coalition-free schemes, the 
principal can implement (e, e) with less costs under side contracting on efforts than under no 
side contracting. 
   See Appendix for the proof." Condition (4.1) implies that increasing the effort of an 
agent reduces the return to increasing the other agent's effort. In this sense, it involves 
substitutabilities rather than complement arities. Mathematically, the condition is equivalent 
 15 Note that this result does not depend on the validity of the first-order approach. 
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to p(.) being submodular when e,,, is chosen from a closed subset of the real line. Observe that 
(4.1) does not hold in Example. When the efforts are complements, the agents are tempted 
to simultaneously increase or decrease from a given symmetric effort pair. Thus, lowering the 
risk imposed on the agents could induce them to deviate to another Nash equilibrium effort 
pair when they coordinate their efforts. 
   One caveat: The assumption of homogeneous agents throughout this section is not in-
nocuous. For simplicity, suppose that transferable utility exists. Then if the assumptions in 
Theorem 3 except for the homogeneity of the agents hold, the coordinated efforts chosen by 
them satisfy the following first-order conditions (assuming. interior solution) for (TCIC 2): 
                  Pi (e1, e2)[(vH - vL) + (vH - vi )] = G1(e1); 
                  p2(el,e2)[(vH - vL) + (vH - vL)} = G2(e2) 
where pn (•) is the derivative of probability of x = XH with regard to e,. These conditions 
yield the following: 
THEOREM 5. Under the assumptions given above, the principal can implement (e1, e2) under 
side contracting on efforts if and only if the effort pair satisfies 
                         px(e1,e2) = Gi(e1) (4.2) 
                          p2(e1,e2) G2' (e2) 
   Condition (4.2) in the theorem implies a sort of efficiency in effort allocation: The effort 
pair (e1, e2) satisfying (4.2) maximizes the probability of the total output being XH subject 
to the sum of the agents' disutilities being constant at some level. The theorem implies that 
the principal loses some control over the agents' effort allocation within a team, when they 
coordinate their efforts for themselves. The benefit of side contracting on efforts is therefore 
ambiguous. Since the second-best effort pair (under no coalition) does not necessarily satisfy 
condition (4.2), the analysis of implementation problems i not sufficient to determine whether 
or not mutual monitoring by agents benefits the principal. The principal's overall problem, 
including the choice of the optimal effort pair, must be examined, while the analysis of general 
agency models has little to say about the optimal second-best efforts. The case of homogeneous 
agents is special in the sense that the second-best effort pair in the coalition-free world satisfies 
(4.2) and hence the benefit of effort coordination realizes as is shown in Theorem 3. 




   Of course, the point made here is not that the benefit from effort coordination is an 
exception under team production. What is shown is that the principal may implement different 
efforts under the two regimes compared here. Because effort coordination is strictly better 
than no coordination when agents are homogeneous, the relative advantage of the case of effort 
coordination will continue to hold for heterogeneous agents, so long as they are sufficiently 
homogeneous.
         5. MUTUAL MONITORING IN EFFORT CHOICE: EFFORT ALLOCATION 
   I next consider a specific form of production externalities a  analyzed in Itoh (1991a). 
Throughout this section, the agents are assumed to be homogeneous so that (a-i)-(a-iv) hold 
with appropriate modifications. Effort variable ,,, has the following specific form: Each agent 
chooses a two-dimensional effort vector e,z = (an, bn) E [0, A] x [0,B) with A > 0 and B > 0. 
The first element a, called his own effort, affects his output. The second element bn is called 
his helping effort which affects the other agent's output. Suppose that the error terms are 
stochastically independent sothat the joint probability of (x1, x2) = (xi, xj) is now written as 
Pig (e1, e2) = Pi (a1, b2 )Pi(a2, b1). The disutility of each agent is a function of his own effort 
and his helping effort. 
   The purpose of this section is to show that restriction on the principal's control over 
the agents' coordinated effort choice is more severe here than the case of team production: 
I show that even though the agents are homogeneous, the principal cannot implement all 
the symmetric effort pair under effort coordination. As in the previous ection, I assume 
SZ = { L, H } with XH > XL. Let p(an, bk) be the probability that output of agent n is XH. 
This is the probability of "success" ofagent n while 1- p(an, bk) is the probability of "failure." 
It is assumed that p(a, b) is strictly increasing in a and b: both own effort and helping effort 
are productive, and strict MLRP holds. 
   This section utilizes the first-order approach. Suppose that p and G are twice-continuously 
differentiable, G is strictly convex, PLL is convex in en for each n, and 0' is convex. Itoh (1991a) 
shows that these assumptions are sufficient for the first-order approach to be valid. The 
convexity of 0' holds, when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is increasing, constant, or 
decreasing relatively slowly in income. Utility functions which are frequently used in examples, 
such as exponential, ogarithmic, or square root, satisfy this condition. Furthermore, I show in 
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Itoh (1991a) that under the assumptions stated above, for a > 0, (i) the optimal coalition-free 
scheme for (a, 0) for each agent isindividual-based, satisfying vH> vL; and (ii) the optimal 
scheme for (a, b) with b > 0 for each agent satisfies vZH > wL and vHi > "vii for i = L, H. 
Note that by symmetry, v! = vii for i, j = L, H. 
   I further assume that PLL is convex in (e1, e2). As in Theorem 3, this ensures that person-
by-person ptimal effort pairs are also globally optimal when the agents coordinate th ir effort 
choice. This assumption also implies that p(e) is concave in e. 
   Suppose that the principal wants to implement effort e = (a, b) with 0 < a < A and 
0 < b < B for each agent!' The first-order conditions for (e, e) when the agents do not side 
contract are given as follows: 
                   Pa(e)[(vHL - vLL) + p(e)A] = Ga(e) 
                  Pb(e)[(vLH - vLL) + p(e)A] = Gb(e) 
                                                               (5.1)
                                2 2 
                         H - vLL) + p(e)A] = Ga(e)                 Pa(e)[(vL 
                                 2 2                 pb(e)[(vH                         L - vLL)+ p(e)A] = Gb(e) 
where A = vHH + vLL - vHL - V} H and the subscripts forp and G represent partial derivatives. 
   When the agents side contract on efforts, the first-order conditions for(e, e) under schedule 
(i1, v2) are, assuming the existence of transferable utility, given as follows: 
           pa(e)[(vHL - vLL) + p(e)A + (IHL - vLL) + P(e)0] =Ga(e) 
                                                             (5.2)
           pb(e)[(vLH - 4L) + p(e)A + (vLH - vLL) + p(e)0] = Gb(e) 
where 0 =vHH + viL - vHL - vLH• From (5.1) and (5.2) the following results hold.17 
THEOREM 6. Under the assumptions given above, (a) when the agents coordinate their effort 
choice via side contracting, the principal can implement e for each agent if and only if 
                         pb(e) = Gb(e) (5.3) 
                        Pa(e) Ga(e)~ 
 16 A sufficient condition for the second-best effort to have positive help is given in Itoh 
(1991a). I present such an example ater in this section.  17 Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1990) also show a result similar to part (b) in the 
theorem. 
                             23
II 
I
and (b) the principal can implement e satisfying (5.3) for each agent with lower costs under 
side contracting on efforts than under no side contracting. 
    The first assertion is immediately obtained from (5.2). The intuition is that unequal risk 
allocation between two outputs for an agent is canceled out by the unequal risk allocation for 
the other agent. Thus, their coordinated effort choice is always based on equal risk allocation 
between two outputs in total. The proof of the second assertion is similar to that of Theorem 
3, and so is omitted. 
   Although here the agents are homogeneous and no multiple equilibrium problem exists, 
the principal cannot implement all the symmetric effort pairs when agents side contract on 
efforts. Condition (5.3) is similar to (4.2), implying that the agents allocate their efforts 
efficiently between two tasks. The theorem implies that if the principal wants each of them to 
do so, that she prefers the agents to coordinate their effort choice. However , the second-best 
effort pair is not necessarily efficient in this sense even in the symmetric situation, unless 
there are some exogenous reasons in favor of "egalitarianism." To see this, note that by 
(5.1), condition (5.3) holds if and only if vLH = Vi L: When the principal wishes for efficient 
allocation of efforts, she must also allocate risk imposed on each agent equally between the 
outputs from two tasks. This is achieved by nonpersonalized reward when one output is high 
and the other is low, regardless of which output is high and which is low. In other words, the 
principal pays each agent contingent only on the aggregate output: the scheme is completely 
team-based (at least in this two-outcome case). 
   The second-best symmetric effort satisfies (5.3) in the following simple specification f the 
model: Suppose that p(a, b) = p(a + b) and G(a, b) = g(a) + h(b) with g and h strictly convex 
and g'(0) = h'(0) = 0. Itoh (1991a) shows that under such a specification, the second-best 
efforts have positive helping effort as well as positive own effort. Given the total amount of 
effort a + b, a and b are then determined by g'(a) = h'(b): If g'(a) > h'(b) (g'(a) < h'(b)), 
the principal could reduce the implementation costs by decreasing a (b) and increasing b (a) 
while keeping a + b fixed. Thus, effort coordination is preferred by the principal in this specific 
case.18 
   Another simple case in which the principal prefers effort coordination to no coalition is 
 18 Further analysis of this case is found in Itoh (1990). 
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the "pure allocation" model: p(a, b) = p(a + b) and G(a, b) = G(a + b). Then (5.3) holds for 
any symmetric effort pair. This is the case analyzed by Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1990). 
They focus on the case of pure allocation, while they extend their analysis to the case in which 
two outputs are correlated with each other.19 
        6. EFFORT COORDINATION A D RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
    The argument in the preceding two sections can be extended to more general cases in 
which both correlation i noise terms and any form of production externalities xist. What 
has been shown there is that the principal prefers effort coordination tono coalition when the 
optimal compensation forhomogeneous agents i  perfectly correlated with each other in the 
absence of coalition, that is, they are paid equally in each outcome. Let me call such a scheme 
egalitarian. When coalition is not taken into account, egalitarian schemes are generally not 
optimal even in symmetric situations. However, if the principal can encourage coordination of
efforts among agents under egalitarian schemes, it may outperform the second-best schemes 
with no coalition. Thus, the principal has stronger incentives to adopt egalitarian, team-
based incentive schemes for homogeneous agents than models without the possibility of side 
contracting on efforts predict. 
    Egalitarian schemes are never optimal in the absence of coalition when no production 
externality exists and there exists systematic risk so that relative performance evaluation is
optimal, that is, each agent is paid higher the lower the output of the other agent is: com-
pensation is negatively correlated. In an extreme case where rank-order tournament schemes 
are adopted, encouraging effort coordination hurts the principal: If an optimal coalition-free 
schedule for an effort pair is a rank-order tournament, the principal cannot reduce the risk 
imposed on each agent without altering their incentives to select he same fforts. Coalition 
under tournaments only leads homogeneous agents to choose the least costly efforts. The 
negative ffect of effort coordination seems to persist when the correlation between the error 
terms is sufficiently high, if not perfect. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Ramakrishnan 
and Thakor (1990) recently show in their specific models that there exists a cut-off value for 
measures of the degree of correlation between the error terms (e.g., correlation coefficient) 
 19 Their analysis is also different from my analysis in that they assume effort sharing is 
infeasible (b = 0) in the absence ofcoalition (or, in their context, in the case of no merger). 





such that effort coordination is preferred to no coalition if and only if the degree of correlation 
is lower than that threshold level. While my model is too general to obtain such a clear result, 
the same basic logic appears to hold. 
   Thus, the analyses in this paper suggest that encouraging coordination in effort choice is 
better the less important systematic risks are relative to production externalities because rel-
ative performance evaluation encourage n gative externalities like "sabotage" (Lazear, 1989), 
or the less costly it is to avoid rank-order tournaments. For example, some "prizes" are indi-
visible or limited in numbers so that competitive schemes are unavoidable (e.g., promotions 
to higher-ranked job titles). Then coalition should be discouraged.
         7. NON-EXISTENCE OF COALITION-PROOF REVELATION MECHANISMS 
    The analyses in the foregoing sections compare the case of effort coordination by agents 
through side contracts with the benchmark case of no coalition, in which the principal attains 
the standard second-best solution via appropriate incentive contracts. As I discussed in Intro-
duction, I therefore exclude the possibility that the principal designs a revelation mechanism 
to induce the agents to report their efforts to her, because of the incompleteness in contracts. 
   In this section, I show that under the full-side-contract assumption, the principal would 
have no incentive to design such a revelation mechanism, if possible, and hence would leave the 
coordination of efforts to the agents who monitor each other's efforts and attain coordination.' 
The logic behind this result is quite simple: under any revelation mechanism that improves 
the principal's welfare, the agents would find an effort pair they both prefer, and collude to 
choose that pair and appropriate messages to the principal. 
   I extend the general model presented in Section 2 to include communication stages. Let 
Mn be the set of a sequence of messages ent to the principal by agent n and Inn be its generic 
element. Each mn consists oftwo kinds of messages and is denoted as mn = (ono, inn) where 
m° is a sequence of messages observable to the other agent, and mn is a sequence of messages 
unobservable to the other agent (observable only to agent nand the principal). Communication 
stages are summarized by reporting strategies of the agents. Let s1 : M2 x E --f M1 be the 
 20 If the agents can monitor each other's efforts and do not side contract, there xists areve-
lation mechanism that can implement the first-best olution as a unique sequential equilibrium 
(Ma, 1988). Of course, such a mechanism requires that the principal be able to contract on 
efforts. 
                            26
reporting strategy of agent 1, which determines his messages dependent on the messages sent 
by agent 2 and the efforts chosen by the agents: E is the set of feasible effort pairs . Of course, 
si depends only on the part of agent 2's messages that are observable to agent 1. The reporting 
strategy of agent 2 82 : M1 x E M2 is similarly defined. 
Example. Consider Ma (1988)'s mechanism which attains the first-best solution when the 
efforts are mutually observable between agents, given that no side contract is possible. There, 
after both agents selecting efforts and observing them, agent 1 reports an effort pair to the 
principal. After observing that effort, agent 2 can "agree" or "challenge," and in the latter 
case, reports a different effort pair. The report of agent 2 is also observable to agent 1. In the 
notation here, this mechanism is described as follows: 
                    m1 = si(ei,e2) E E 
                   m2 = s2 (m1, e1i e2) E {agree, challenge} x E. 
    The payoff to agent n is determined by not only outcomes but also messages he has sent 
to the principal, and the part of messages of the other agent that are observable to agent n. 
Let v!-(m1, m°) and v (m2, m°) be the payoffs toagents 1 and 2, respectively, when (7771, m2)       23 -
has been reported to the principal, and the true outcomes are (i,3*) E 91 X Q2-
   Fix an effort pair (e1, e2). The principal designs a mechanism soas to implement this 
effort pair with least costs. I do not need to specify exactly how each mechanism mplements 
the efforts. Suppose that here xists a mechanism which can implement (e1, e2). Let (fi-11, 7i-12) 
be the messages actually sent under that mechanism. For my purpose it is then sufficient to 
note that because of the full-side-contract assumption, the mechanism hould be coalition-
proof: Under the mechanism, the agents cannot find a pair of efforts (61,62) and a pair of 
messages observable etween them, (777° , 9720 ), such that they Pareto dominate (eli e2) and 
(m°, m° ). Then the following result holds. 
THEOREM 7. Suppose that ransferable utility exists. Then there does not exist a coalition-
proof mechanism which implements a given effort pair with lower costs than the optimal con-
tracts for effort coordination case can do without revelation of the agents' efforts o the prin-
cipal. 
PROOF: Suppose that such amechanism exists. Using the notations above, let (v Q                                                          ') bethe
compensation scheme actually rewarded to agent n in the mechanism: Forexample, v~ _ 
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iv ~(rni, rn°). Since by assumption (v1, v2) are less costly to the principal than the optimal 
contracts solving (EC), the former schemes should not be feasible under problem (EC). Noting 
that transferable utility exists and that the mechanism must be coalition-proof , it implies that 
(TCIC 2) must be violated: there must exist an effort pair (el , E2), different from (el, Q), such 
that 
              ~~Pij(e1,e2)(;V j +vj)-Gi(e1)-G2(e2) 
                    i j 
                  E Pij(el,e2)(v j+ ~)-G1(el)-G2(e2). 
                       i j
However, the agents are then better off by agreeing to choose (e1, e2) and send messages 
(no, m°) under the mechanism, which contradicts he coalition-proofness of the mechanism. 
                                                                          Q.E.D. 
   The theorem shows obviously that when agents ide contract on efforts, coalition-proof 
mechanisms add nothing more to the principal than she can attain without knowing their 
private information.21 One can therefore interpret the incentive system considered in this 
paper as a sort of delegation mechanism: the principal delegates arrangement of cooperation 
to the agents who coordinate their actions via mutual monitoring and side contracting. Such 
delegation benefits the principal under the conditions shown in the paper.
i
                           8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
   The main conclusion of this paper is that the principal sometimes prefers her agents to 
behave as a group than to behave independently (or competitively). Under the assumption 
that the agents freely side contract on what hey can commonly observe, coalitional behavior 
is of value to the principal only if the agents hare some private information. If the agents can 
monitor each other's actions perfectly, the principal can delegate coordination of actions to 
the agents, and such a delegation is likely to be beneficial under (a) individualistic production 
without substantial systematic risk; (b) team production with sufficiently homogeneous agents; 
(c) workplace with a lot of interaction among homogeneous agents (who perform multiple 
tasks) and with pressure to egalitarianism. 
 21 The result depends on the existence of transferable utility. If transferable utility did not 
exist, revelation mechanisms could be of value to the principal because she could improve 
payoff allocation between the agents by centralizing their private information. 
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    The full-side-contract assumption is very important for these results .2' Although I take 
the coalitional behavior as an assumption throughout he paper, the future research should 
treat it as endogenous, temming from organizational design, and ask when side contracting 
behavior arises. To induce coalitional behavior, the principal should enable the agents to 
enforce their side contracts easily. Here I discuss three types of enforcement mechanisms. 
    First mechanism is reputation. Economists' explanation of cooperation by self-interested 
agents involves repetition of a one-shot decision making situation. Loosely speaking, the liter-
ature on repeated games hows that cooperation can be attained as a perfect Nash equilibrium 
of the repeated game if the one-shot game is repeated sufficiently many times, the players can 
observe ach other's actions perfectly after each one-shot game, and they discount heir future 
payoffs sufficiently small. See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). 
    Of course, under long-term relationships, the principal has an incentive to design long-
term contracts based on repeated observations ofagents' outputs for the purpose of risk spread 
over time. Thus, one might doubt the validity of the static representation of the model in the 
paper, provided that long-term relationships are necessary for enforcement of side contracts. 
However, this argument merely strengthens our result that coalitional behavior is beneficial to 
the principal: the principal is better off by encouraging coalition via long-term relationships 
by and spreading risk over time than by keeping relationships hort. What has been shown 
is that even without the possibility of risk spread over time, long-term relationships could be 
advantageous to the principal because they make enforcement of beneficial coalition among 
agents easier. 
   Second mechanism is related to the first one. Suppose that the relationship between the 
principal and the agents is one shot while the agents have other opportunities to transact 
with each other (or maybe with other common principals). One example is "social relation" 
among agents. They may spend resources to reduce their disutility of work, for example, 
by showing respects, cheering up each other, listening to others' complaints, and so on. If 
the agents interact with each other in other occasions, their cooperation could be induced.23 
 22 The benefit of "cooperation" among agents can be explained without this assumption, h
owever. When there are production externalities, observation.of mutual help does not imply 
that agents are behaving as a group, because with appropriate pay schemes, they could help 
each other for their own interests. And the principal sometimes prefers such cooperation to 
competition among them (Itoh, 1990, 1991a).  23 Casual observation i dicates that in Japanese firms work groups are the primary func-
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i
For example, see Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) and Okuno (1984) for ostracism enforcing 
cooperation. 
   The last mechanism is associated with laboratory experiments on human cooperation. 
The literature identifies other factors to derive cooperation. (See Dawes and Thaler (1988) 
for a survey and references.) It is typical that cooperation can be observed even in one-shot 
experiments. And some experiments find that cooperation rates are significantly higher when 
discussion is allowed before the decision than not, and given discussion, when each subject 
is told that his/her cooperation improves the welfare of the other members in the.team to 
which he/she belongs, rather than those in the other team (Ordell et al., 1988). This latter 
condition is called "group identity" by the authors. Frank (1988) attributes such results to 
the importance of emotions. He writes: 
        To cheat a stranger and to cheat someone you have met personally amount o 
       precisely the same thing in rational terms. Yet, in emotional terms, they are 
       clearly very different. Face-to-face discussion, even if not directly relevant 
       to the game itself, transforms the other players from mere strangers into 
       real people. Discussion about what is the "right" thing to do in prisoner's 
       dilemmas further arouses the relevant emotions. And still higher levels of 
       emotional involvement are evoked by explicit promises to cooperate. (Frank, 
       1988, pp. 224-225.) 
He then goes on to argue that it is important for the firm to design aworking environment that 
encourages the emotions supporting cooperation in order to increase propensity to cooperate. 
   This paper has focused on coalition among agents which benefits principals. Of course, 
coalition has costs as well. Tirole (1986) fully discusses detrimental coalition (manipulation 
of information) based on his analysis of vertical relationships of a principal, asupervisor, and 
an agent. The analyses in Sections 4 and 5 point out another source of the costs: the loss of 
control over the agents' effort allocation. Since encouraging cooperation tends to encourage 
collusion as well, the net benefits from coalitional behavior may be smaller than we expect 
tional units rather than individual jobs (Aoki, 1988; Kagono et al., 1985; Lincoln and McBride, 
1987). Enforcement ofcoalitional behavior seems easier there than in Western firms partly 
because of longer tenure of Japanese mployees. It is also interesting tofind that there are far 
more opportunities for interpersonal contacts in Japanese firms than in Western counterparts, 
such as no personal office, teamwork, food/housing/medical facilities, or vacation tours for 
employees. 
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from the results of the paper. We will need to analyze the tradeoff between costs and benefits 
of coalitional behavior more explicitly. 
    We should also look for how to avoid detrimental coalition while encourage beneficial 
coalition, if any. One possible way is to reward agents more by promotion than by monetary 
pay. Promotion to more visible tasks and evaluation of supervisors based on their subordinates' 
future performance could alleviate their incentives to misrepresent information via collusion
, 
without losing benefits from cooperation among agents. Another possibility is the use of 
job rotations both within and across work groups. Regular job rotations within a group 
facilitate mutual monitoring and sanctioning among workers in the group and thereby effort 
coordination (without increasing the danger of detrimental coalition). On the other hand, job 
rotations across groups, factories, or divisions typically accompany changes of bosses, which 
practice keeps vertical relationships short and hence restricts side transfers. Of course, the 
latter type of job rotations will also make the relationship among workers short
, while the 
former type will complement this shortcoming.24
24 See Itoh (1991b) for applications of these ideas to Japanese human resource management. 
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                          Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 3. 
    Suppose that (vi) is the optimal coalition-free scheme for a given effort pair (e, e). Define 
the new scheme (vi) by 
                         vi= 2vi+2H (A1) 
for each i, where H = U + G(e). The new schedule clearly satisfies (PC). 
   To show that (CIC 2) holds under the new schemes, I first show that (e, e) maximizes the 
sum of the agents' expected utilities under the new scheme, which is equal to 
              p(el, e2 )vH +(1 - p(el, e2 ))vL - G(ei) - G(e2) + H. (A2) 
To see this, note that (e, e) is a person-by-person maximizing effort pair of (A2). And the 
convexity of p(.) implies that (A2) is convex in (e1, e2). This is then sufficient for (e, e) to be 
a global maximizer of (Al). (See Marschak and Radner (1972), Theorem 5.1.) Then as in the 
proof of Theorem 2, (CIC 2) is in fact satisfied by setting U2 equal to the agent 2's expected 
utility. Because the expected utility of agent 1 is also equal to U2 , the new scheme satisfies 
(CIC 1) with A = 1. 
   To see (CIC 3) hold, let (eN, eN) be a Nash equilibrium selected by the agents when they 
do not reach agreement. Then since (e, e) maximizes the sum of the agents' expected utilities 
(A2), p(e, e)vH + (1 - p(e, e))vL - 2G(e) > p(eN, eN)vH + (1 - p(eN, eN))vL - 2G(eN) holds. 
This leads to 
 p(e, e)iH + (1 - p(e, e))vL - G(e) = 2 (p(e, e)vH + (I- p(e, e))vL - 2G(e)) + 2 H 
                        >2(p(eN) eN)vH + (1 - p(eN, eN))vL - 2G(eN)) + 2 H 
                        =2(p(eN, eN)vH + (1 - p(eN, eN))vL) - G(eN) + 2H. 
Thus, each agent's expected utility under (e, e) is at least as large as that under (eN, eN). 
   The principal's expected payments are smaller under (47i) than under (vi) by Jensen's 
inequality and the fact that (vi) satisfies (PC). Thus, the principal isbetter off under the new 
scheme. 
   Finally, by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, the agents, once they accept 




Proof of Theorem 4 
   Let (VL, vH) be the optimal coalition-free schemes implementing (e, e). Since e is not 
least costly, vH > VL holds. It is sufficient to show that the schemes defined by (Al) satisfy 
constraints (CIC 2). And to show this, it is sufficient to show that (e, e) maximizes the sum 
of the agents' expected utilities given in (A2). Let (er, e2) maximize (A2) and suppose that 
(e, e) does not. Then, 
          p(ei, e2)(vH - vL) - G(el) - G(e2) > p(e, e)(vH - vL) - 2G(e). (A3) 
Since (e, e) is a dominant Nash equilibrium under the original schemes, we have 
              p(ei, e2)(vH - VL) - Glen) < p(e, e)(vH - VL) - G(e) 
for n = 1, 2. These two inequalities yield G(en) < G(e), and hence n < e for each n. Then 
    [p(e, e)(vH - VL) - 2G(e)] - [p(ei, ea)(vH - VL) - G(ei) - G(e2)] 
       = (p(e, e) - p(e, e2))(vH - VL) + (p(e, e2) - p(e', e2))(vH - VL) - SG1 - 6G2 
        (p(e, e) - p(e, e2))(vH - VL) + (p(e, e) - p(ei, e))(vH - VL) - 6G1 - SG2 
        > SG2 + 6G1 - SG1 - SG2 = 0 
where SGn = G(e) - G(en). The first inequality follows from (4.1) and the second inequality 
holds because (e, e) is a Nash equilibrium. This contradicts (A3). Thus, (e, e) maximizes the 
sum of the agents' expected utilities under the new schemes defined by (4.1), which implies 
that (CIC 2) is satisfied.
i
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